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A B S T R A C T
Previous studies suggest that understanding of non-literal expressions, and in particular metaphors, can be
impaired in people with schizophrenia; although it is not clear why. We explored metaphor comprehension
capacity using a novel picture selection paradigm; we compared task performance between people with schi-
zophrenia and healthy comparator subjects and we further examined the relationships between the ability to
interpret figurative expressions non-literally and performance on a number of other cognitive tasks. Eye-tracking
was used to examine task strategy. We showed that even when IQ, years of education, and capacities for theory
of mind and associative learning are factored in as covariates, patients are significantly more likely to interpret
metaphorical expressions literally, despite eye-tracking findings suggesting that patients are following the same
interpretation strategy as healthy controls. Inhibitory control deficits are likely to be one of multiple factors
contributing to the poorer performance of our schizophrenia group on the metaphor trials of the picture selection
task.
1. Introduction
Figurative language, in which the speaker intends to communicate
something other than what is linguistically encoded, is pervasive in
human communication (Bowdle and Gentner, 2005). Metaphorical ex-
pressions such as “Hope is the knot at the end of a rope”, in which the
attributes of one item are ascribed to another, have been reported to be
used six times in every minute of discourse (Gibbs, 1994).
Like everyone, patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia have been
exposed to non-literal language from the moment they enter the lin-
guistic realm, yet they are considered to be impaired in their ability to
accurately interpret non-literal expressions during acute episodes of
psychosis and when in remission (Drury et al., 1998; Mo et al., 2008),
and to have difficulty with the contextually dependent aspects of lan-
guage (inferring meaning in context) more generally (Bazin et al., 2005;
Colle et al., 2013; Haas et al., 2015; Langdon et al., 2002; Linscott,
2005). Indeed, the propensity to “take things too literally” or for
“concrete thinking” has long been considered to be a characteristic of
schizophrenia (Harrow et al., 1974). This impairment in interpretation
of figurative language is associated with reduced sensitivity to social
cues (Corrigan and Green, 1993), is negatively correlated with insight
(Nakano et al., 2004) and is shown in those with diagnoses of schizo-
phrenia spectrum-disorders (Mossaheb et al., 2014). Previous studies of
metaphor comprehension have relied on participants giving verbal
explanations to stories which incorporate figurative language (Drury
et al., 1998; Mo et al., 2008) or to proverbs (Haas et al., 2015). How-
ever, it is not clear whether the apparent deficits shown in these studies
are consequent on metaphor processing per se or on the metalinguistic
processing required for the test response. Moreover, it is not fully un-
derstood whether the metaphor processing deficit is a specific impair-
ment or whether is it part of (or indeed driven by) a broader array of
cognitive impairment, including for instance deficits in Theory of Mind
(ToM) (the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others),
IQ, broader aspects of language comprehension or working memory
capacity.
On encountering a metaphor, the hearer must arrive at a figurative
interpretation based on numerous contextually determined variables.
There is now, largely, a consensus to reject sequential processing
models of metaphor, in which a default literal interpretation must first
be arrived at and rejected, as contextually inappropriate, before a more
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appropriate alternative meaning can be derived. Instead, parallel pro-
cessing models are favoured (Gentner et al., 2001; Glucksberg et al.,
2001; Rubio-Fernández et al., 2015). It remains a matter of debate how
nominal metaphors of the form X is Y (e.g., the fridge is a monster) are
processed, specifically whether they are processed as categorization
statements (Carston, 2002; Glucksberg et al., 2001; Wilson and Carston,
2007) or as implicit comparison statements (Clement and Gentner,
1991; Forbus et al., 1994; Gentner et al., 1993; Wolff and Gentner,
2011). However, most current accounts endorse the view that, during
the processing of novel nominal metaphors, features associated with the
literal meaning of the metaphor vehicle, in this example the “monster”,
which are not relevant to the metaphorical interpretation, are not at-
tended to (lose activation), while those features that are relevant to the
interpretation are attended to (remain activated). Some authors have
interpreted their findings as providing evidence of active inhibition of
metaphor irrelevant features during the processing of novel metaphors
(Gemsbacher et al., 1995; Gernsbacher et al., 2001; McGlone and
Manfredi, 2001; Papagno et al., 2003; Pierce et al., 2010; Rubio-
Fernandez, 2007). It is notable therefore that impaired inhibitory
control has been shown in Alzheimer's disease (Amanzio et al., 2008;
Papagno et al., 2003), Asperger syndrome (Gold et al., 2010), Parkin-
son's disease (Monetta and Pell, 2007) and schizophrenia (Badcock
et al., 2002; Mossaheb et al., 2014; Thoma et al., 2009) – all conditions
associated with metaphor comprehension deficits (Amanzio et al.,
2008; Hermann et al., 2013; Mo et al., 2008; Monetta and Pell, 2007;
Roncero and de Almeida, 2014) – and that individuals with Alzheimer's
disease, on a sentence-picture matching task, appeared to recognise the
correct interpretation of figurative statements but failed to suppress the
selection of a salient but contextually inappropriate literal alternative
(Papagno et al., 2003). Previous findings have also suggested that im-
paired inhibitory control deficits are associated with poorer metaphor
comprehension capacities in schizophrenia (Badcock et al., 2002;
Mossaheb et al., 2014; Thoma et al., 2009). However, these studies did
not explicitly build inhibition into the metaphor task. Rather, this
conclusion was drawn on the basis of an association between perfor-
mance on a metaphor task and performance on an inhibitory control
task. The disorders mentioned above are characterized by a number of
cognitive deficits which might contribute to difficulties in metaphor
comprehension. This association between impaired inhibitory control
and metaphor comprehension deficits has allowed authors to assume a
causal mechanism but this assumption has not been effectively tested,
which means we can't rule out the possibility that this might be an
epiphenomenon.
Theory of mind (ToM) has also been shown to be impaired in
schizophrenia (Brüne, 2005; Frith, 1992; Harrington et al., 2005),
which is relevant because it has been argued that a fully developed ToM
is required in order to arrive at non-literal interpretations (Happé,
1993). Relevance theorists Sperber and Wilson, argue that “commu-
nication exploits the well-known ability of humans to attribute inten-
tions to each other” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) and that, therefore,
individuals who have impaired ToM, and who, as a result, cannot at-
tribute beliefs and intentions to other people proficiently, will have
difficulty comprehending utterances in which the speaker intends to
convey something over and above that which their utterance encodes,
especially metaphorically intended utterances. This is taken to provide
an explanation of why children under the age of 4 and individuals on
the Autistic Spectrum appear to have difficulty comprehending meta-
phors. Both populations fail false belief tasks ((Happé, 1993; Norbury,
2005), e.g. the Sally-Anne task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983)), which are
taken to be indicative of whether or not an individual has first order
(first-order false-belief tasks require the attribution of false beliefs to
others within the context of real events; whereas, second-order false-
belief tasks require the participant to reason about other people's
thoughts/beliefs) ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Bartsch and Wellman,
1995; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik and Wellman, 1994; Perner,
1991; Wellman and Gelman, 1998; Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Pouscoulous and Tomasello's (Pouscoulous and Tomasello, 2011) and
Deamer's (Deamer, 2013) findings, however suggest otherwise; they
show that children as young as 3-years-old, who would typically fail a
false-belief task, are capable of interpreting basic metaphorical lan-
guage. The role that mental state (or intention) attribution plays in
metaphor comprehension is, therefore, not clear-cut. In schizophrenia
studies, subjects are shown to underperform on simple social inference
tasks compared with healthy controls and with non-psychotic psy-
chiatric control groups, but the relationship between social inference
(including ToM) and non-literal language comprehension is incon-
sistent (Mo et al., 2008). It is possible that contradictory findings are
reflective of insufficient statistical power or the use of metaphorical
materials which place different demands on ToM capacity. Metaphors
that pertain to emotions and feelings (“The man exploded”, said of a
very angry man) might require more mental state attribution and un-
derstanding of affective associations (i.e., anger-explosion) than purely
perceptual metaphors (“The man was a tomato”, said of a man with a
red complexion). It is possible that impaired ToM in schizophrenia
might present a barrier to accurately comprehend emotionally ex-
pressive metaphors but not purely perceptual metaphors.
In this pilot study, we set out to examine metaphor processing using
an action, rather than verbal, response to ameliorate any potentially
confounding metalinguistic competency deficits (Deamer, 2013), in
order to establish the metaphor comprehension capacities of people
with schizophrenia. To select the correct figurative picture from literal
and control foils in this task, the participants must resist the temptation
to interpret the expression literally while processing spoken stories.
Instead, they must rely on the context in order to make a pragmatic
inference about the meaning of the metaphorical statement. We tested
participants' comprehension of novel metaphors. We avoided conven-
tional metaphors to make sure we were not testing prior acquisition of
their lexicalized meaning, but, rather, the ability to arrive at an accu-
rate, contextually relevant interpretation. We also tracked participants'
eye movements and fixations while they made their picture selection in
order to explore the underlying processes of metaphor interpretation, as
these measures allowed us to assess the extent to which patients im-
plicitly processed the different picture types (e.g., ability to inhibit
looking at the literal picture). There is a large literature validating the
use of fixation time measure to access higher order cognitive processing
(see Rayner and Morris, 1990 for a thorough review). This literature
strongly suggests that there is a close relationship between what
someone is looking at, and what they are processing. Moreover, Poyner
and Morris (2003) demonstrate that the eye-fixation duration measures
are sensitive to the process of generating inferences.
By tracking the participants' eye fixations as they interpret target
sentences metaphorically, hyperbolically and literally, we will be able
to see in real-time, the regions of the picture that they are fixating on at
any given point during the process of making their selection. Reading-
times provide us with a measure of a quantitative difference between
the processing of the two tropes, but the use of different kinds of eye-
tracking measures should allow us to make inferences about the ex-
istence of qualitative differences between the processing of metaphors
and literal items.
Lastly, we investigated the role of other putative confounding
variables that may impact metaphor comprehension including illness
and cognitive factors, current and pre-morbid IQ, years of education,
ToM and associative learning capacities.
In summary, the methodology outlined below was put in place as a
pilot study to address the following question; do individuals with a
diagnosis of schizophrenia have more difficulty processing metapho-
rical language than their healthy counterparts, and relative to com-
parable literal language? We hypothesised that, even when any po-
tentially confounding metalinguistic competency deficits are
ameliorated (as in our study design), individuals with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia will show reduced performance (slower response times,
more incorrect picture selections, and increased fixation times on the
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literal picture on metaphor trials) on the metaphor comprehension task
relative to healthy controls.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
As part of the Psychosis and Language Study (Cokal et al., 2018), 19
(6 males) monolingual English speaking participants with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia were recruited from Northumberland, Tyne and Wear
NHS Foundation Trust. Fifteen (8 males) monolingual English speaking
healthy controls were also recruited by local advertisement. Informed
consent was obtained from all participants. Patients and comparators
were matched for age, and reported years of full time education.16 of
the patients were taking at least one antipsychotic (7 clozapine), 1 was
taking sodium valproate, 3 antidepressants, 3 a benzodiazepine, 1
pregabalin, 1 propanolol and 1 codeine. Patients had a mean lifetime
illness duration of 209 (STD=108.5) months. A National Adult
Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982) was used as a measure of pre-
morbid IQ, a Wechsler Abbreviated Test of Intelligence (from which the
full scale IQ was calculated) (Wechsler, 2008) and a Positive and Ne-
gative Syndrome Scale (Kay et al., 1987) was completed with each
participant, and we generated a full scale IQ (FSIQ) using the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (Table 1).
2.2. Picture selection task (PST)
After being presented with clear instructions (from a written script
to ensure consistency), the participants heard a series of pre-recorded
stories, presented in random order, one at a time. There were fifteen
metaphor stories (Rubio-Fernandez, 2007) and seven literal stories
(Deamer, 2013) (see Appendix A). For the metaphorical stimuli, a series
of common nouns were used as metaphor vehicles, with a metaphori-
cally biased context for each of the nouns. Each context ended in a
nominal metaphor of the form “X is a Y”, with X always being the
metaphor topic, and Y the metaphor vehicle. As the metaphors were
novel, the preceding context comprised one or two sentences to ensure
that the nominal metaphor would be understandable (e.g. “After six
months without going to the barber, John is a lion.”). The literal stories
(e.g. “Sam and Mark had the weekend off, and went to a national park for
the weekend. The national park was a forest.”) were matched for length
with the metaphor stories. Duration of metaphor story recordings
ranged from 4.68 to 9.64 s (mean: 7.34 s); literal story duration ranged
from 6.48 to 10.84 s (mean: 8.74 s). Stories were presented once, and it
was not possible to hear them a second time.
After each story, the participants were asked to mouse click on
which of three similar pictures (presented to them in a triangular
format on the screen; see Fig. 1) “went together with the story”. In the
case of the metaphor items there was: a metaphor picture (the appro-
priate response, depicting the metaphoric interpretation, e.g. a man
with very long and messy hair), a control picture (which was related but
did not contain any elements corresponding to either the literal or
figurative meaning of the metaphorical expression), as well as a literal
picture (including a literal interpretation of the target word in the
background, e.g., a lion suit). The literal option was included to enable
examination of whether participants were able to inhibit a literal in-
terpretation of the metaphor vehicle, and was also designed to not re-
present a possible literal interpretation of the utterance as a whole (for
example, if it had included an anthropomorphized lion) as asking the
participant to select from two plausible interpretations – one meta-
phorical, the other literal – would examine metalinguistic rather than
metaphor comprehension skills. The position of the three pictures was
counterbalanced (between bottom right, bottom left and top middle)
across trials. The trials were presented in a fixed order. All pictures
were commissioned for this study. The task worked exactly the same for
the literal items. However, the three pictures to select from were as
follows: a correct picture (the appropriate response, depicting the in-
tended literal interpretation), two control pictures (both contextually
plausible in different ways but including no element corresponding to
the intended literal meaning of the final sentence of the story).
In addition to the experimental items, there were two practice items
which followed the same format as the experimental items without the
use of a figurative expression; e.g., “This weekend, Sally is at the park. She
is having lots of fun riding on her bike in the park. Can you find the picture of
Sally riding her bike in the park?” see Appendix A for full list of practice
and experimental items. Feedback was given to the participants during
the practice trials, but not during the experimental trials.
2.3. Eye-tracking system
Eye movements were recorded using an Eyelink 1000 eye tracking
system (SR Research Ltd., Ottawa, Ontario, Canada). Participants were
seated at a distance of 117 cm from a 24-inch colour monitor at
1920×1080 pixel resolution. They positioned their chin and forehead
on a chin rest to minimise head movement and ensure standardised
distance from the monitor. The Eyelink system sampled participants'
eye position at 1000 Hz from the onset of the pictures appearing on the
screen to the point at which they made their picture selection (mouse
click). With the chin rest, the system had an average spatial accuracy of
0.25°–0.5° and average resolution (variability) of 0.01°. These values
were sufficient for the size of pictures we used. A 35mm lens was fo-
cussed and orientated in the horizontal plane for monocular viewing.
The eye that was most readily tracked was selected for data collection.
A nine-point calibration and validation were performed before running
the PST.
2.4. Theory of mind
The Revised Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was performed
after the PST as an assessment of first-order ToM. Participants were
presented with a booklet containing 36 photographs of the eye-region
of different actors and actresses. Each photograph was accompanied by
a choice of four words. Participants were instructed to choose “which
word best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or
feeling”. Selections were verbalised to an examiner who recorded re-
sponses. Participants scored one mark for each correctly identified
word, yielding a maximum score of 36. Participants were advised to
request the definition of words they were unsure of, which were read to
them from the glossary if required.
2.5. Eye-tracking data pre-processing
The Eyelink system removed blinks and other eye-movement
Table 1
Group comparison of demographic and cognitive characteristics.
HC (n=15)
Mean (SD)
SCZ (n=19)
Mean (SD)
Group difference
T (df) p
Age 45.1 (13.0) 42.5 (10.3) 0.649 (32) 0.521
Years education 16.3 (3.6) 13.6 (4.1) 1.998 (32) 0.054
Full-scale IQ (FSIQ-4) 106.9 (8.5) 89.0 (16.9) 3.74 (32) 0.001**
premorbid IQ (NART) 109.1 (8.7) 95.3 (14.5) 3.25 (32) 0.003**
PANSS 40.1(5.8) 97.2(18.3) 11.6 (32) < 0.0005**
TOM 28.0 (3.9) 22.5 (5.8) 3.1 (30) 0.004**
Comparison of demographic characteristics between healthy controls (HC) and
participants with schizophrenia (SCZ) including age, years of full time educa-
tion, IQ as measured using the full scale IQ-4 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale (WAIS), the National Adult Reading Test (NART) score which is used as an
estimate of pre-morbid intelligence and Theory of Mind (TOM) measured using
the Revised Eyes Test. Data shown is mean and, in parenthesis, standard de-
viation and the comparison column shows the results of independent t-test.
< .05
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artefacts, and provided the x- and y-coordinates and duration of each
fixation. To analyze the eye-tracking data, we defined areas of interests
(AOIs) for two separate analyses. In the first analysis, the metaphor,
literal and control pictures (on each trial) served as AOIs (as frequency
and length of fixations on the different pictures will provide insight into
the participants' decision making process prior to their picture selec-
tion). In the second analysis, the literal pictures of metaphor trials were
divided into sixths; the sixth which contained the literal depiction of the
metaphor vehicle (i.e., the literal target) was defined as an AOI (be-
cause more fixations or extended looking time in this area on metaphor
trials would suggest a tendency to interpret metaphor vehicles literally,
even if the participant is ultimately able to override this tendency to
make the correct non-literal selection). The literal target for two pic-
tures did not fall within one-sixth of the literal picture and so these
pictures were excluded from the literal-target analysis.
For each participant and each AOI, we computed three measures
from the eye-tracking data. First, we computed the mean looking time
by summing the duration of all fixation within that AOI for each trial
and then dividing by the number of trials. Second, we computed the
mean proportion of looking time by dividing each AOI's looking time by
the sum of all looking times. Lastly, we computed the mean fixation
duration for each AOI by summing all fixations with durations> 120
ms and dividing by the total number of fixations.
2.6. Statistical analysis
As our primary interest for this study was to explore the differences
between the different participant groups, metaphor and literal trials
were analysed separately. For metaphor trials the number of correct
responses, number of incorrectly chosen literal interpretations and in-
correctly chosen control pictures were determined for each participant.
For literal trials the number of correct responses was determined. No
distinction between the two incorrect options was made for these trials
and the number of incorrect responses is simply the number of correct
responses subtracted from the number of literal trials.
Statistical analyses were performed in SPSS version 23. Analyses of
trial responses (e.g. number of metaphor trials correctly answered)
were performed using generalized linear models that modelled the re-
sponse as proportion of events out of a fixed number of trials (15 for
metaphor trials, 7 for literal trials) and which used a logit link function
between the model predictors and the dependent variable. Analyses of
eye-movement data were performed using analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) and t-tests.
3. Results
3.1. Picture selections
The proportion of responses to the different items of the PST is
shown in Fig. 2. On metaphor trials, the patient group identified the
correct picture significantly less often (mean proportion=0.60, 95%
Wald CI: 0.54–0.65) than healthy controls (mean=0.80, CI: 0.74–0.84,
Wald-χ2= 22.36, p < .001). Patients (mean= 0.37, CI: 0.31–0.43)
were more likely to incorrectly pick the literal picture than healthy
controls (mean=0.18, CI: 0.14–0.24, Wald-χ2=20.625, p < .001).
Control pictures were incorrectly picked infrequently by both groups
(patients: mean=0.04, CI: 0.02–0.06; controls: mean=0.02, CI:
0.01–0.05) and there was no significant difference in the proportion of
these types of errors between groups (Wald-χ2=0.717, p= .397).
Both groups performed equally well on the literal trials (patients:
mean=0.94, CI: 0.88–0.97; controls: mean=0.93, CI: 0.87–0.97)
with performance near ceiling level and no significant difference be-
tween them (Wald-χ2=0.042, p= .837).
A further generalized linear model, further looked at the type of
errors participants were making in the metaphor task, by predicting the
proportion of “literal” errors among all errors. Because two healthy
controls did not make any errors, they could not be included in this
analysis (proportion of literal errors is undefined for them). This ana-
lysis found no significant difference between groups (Wald-χ2= 0.183,
p= .669). When participants made errors on metaphor trials, the pro-
portion of these errors that were literal was approximately the same in
the patient group (mean=0.91, CI: 0.85 to 0.95) as in the control
Fig. 1. Picture choices for the metaphor item “John was a lion”: Picture (a) is the literal picture, (b) the control and (c) the metaphor.
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group (mean=0.89, CI: 0.76 to 0.95). The confidence intervals for
both groups were above 0.5 indicating that participants in both groups
were more likely to choose the literal picture than the control picture
when making an incorrect response to metaphor trials.
3.2. Eye-tracking
Eye-tracking data were available for 22 of the 34 participants (10
healthy controls, 12 patients). The remaining 12 participants were ex-
cluded from data analyses because they were not able to sit still enough
for their eyes to be tracked or were not able to see well enough without
wearing glasses; this prevented their eyes from being accurately
tracked.
In the picture analysis, the three measures were submitted to se-
parate 2 group (control, patient)× 3 AOI (control picture, literal pic-
ture, metaphor picture) mixed ANOVAs. There was a main effect of AOI
for mean looking time, F(2,40)= 5.26, p= .009, partial-η2= 0.208;
mean proportion looking time, F(2,40)= 27.48, p < .001, partial-
η2= 0.579; and mean fixation duration, F(2,40)= 3.58, p= .04, par-
tial-η2= 0.152. There was an effect at the trend level of group for mean
looking time, F(1,20)= 3.14, p= .09, partial-η2= 0.136 (control:
mean=1700ms, SD=320ms; patients: mean= 2469ms,
SD=292ms). All other main effects and interactions were not sig-
nificant (Fs < 1.80, ps > 0.20, partial-η2 < .-082). See Table 2.
In the literal-target analysis, we compared the three measures be-
tween control and patient participants for the literal-target AOI (the
sixth of the literal picture which contained the literal depiction of the
metaphor vehicle). Only the mean looking time differed between group,
t(20)= 2.32, p= .03, Cohen's d= 1.03, with patients looking at the
literal target (mean= 1083ms, SD=215ms) more than twice longer
than control participants (mean=501ms, SD=92ms). Mean
proportion looking time (t=1.302, p= .208, d= 0.54) and mean
fixation duration (t=1.116, p= .277, d=0.48) did not differ between
groups.
3.2.1. Relationships between metaphor comprehension and other variables
using the eye-tracking data
Across both groups (with group controlled for), the mean looking
time for the literal-target AOI (Wald-χ2=6.75, p= .009, r=−0.37)
was negatively related to the number of correctly selected metaphor
pictures. For mean proportion looking time, this negative relationship
existed for the literal AOI (Wald-χ2=5.74, p= .02, r=−0.34) and
literal-target AOI (Wald-χ2=23.27, p < .001, r=−0.70), and was
positively related to the number of correctly selected metaphor pictures
for the metaphor AOI (Wald-χ2= 6.63, p= .01, r=0.36). All other
eye-movement measures were not significantly correlated with the
number of correctly selected metaphor pictures.
Table 3 shows the relationships between performance on the me-
taphor trials with cognitive and clinical characteristics and reveals that
age and years of education predict the number of correct responses on
the metaphor items of the picture selection task.
4. Discussion
We demonstrated reduced performance on the metaphor compre-
hension task in schizophrenia. This finding is broadly consistent with
existing findings relating to metaphor comprehension capacities in
those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Drury et al., 1998; Mo et al.,
2008). However, the use of an action (picture selection) rather than a
verbal response paradigm allows us to be more confident that the dif-
ference between the schizophrenia group and healthy control group
performance is not related to the extra cognitive demands involved in
Fig. 2. Proportion of responses during the Picture Selection Task. Error bars represent 95%-Wald-CI.
Table 2
Eye tracking data showing the time spent looking at the different picture types during the picture selection task.
Controls (n=10)a Schizophrenia (n=12)a Comparisonb
Metaphor
picture
Literal
picture
Control
picture
Metaphor
picture
Literal
picture
Control
picture
Metaphor vs
Literal
Metaphor vs
Control
Literal vs
Control
Mean looking time (ms)c 2021 (419) 1518 (359) 1561 (270) 2741 (383) 2621 (327) 2043 (247) n.s. 3.64 (0.002) n.s.
Mean proportion looking
timec
0.42 (0.02) 0.35 (0.02) 0.31 (0.01) 0.41 (0.01) 0.35 (0.02) 0.29 (0.01) 3.77 (0.001) 8.77 (< 0.001) 3.37 (0.003)
Fixation duration (ms)c 258 (9) 242 (12) 252 (14) 280 (9) 268 (11) 264 (13) 2.57 (0.01) 2.09 (0.05)d n.s.
a Data shown are mean (standard error of the mean).
b Students dependent t-test. Data shown are t (p).
c For a description of these measures, see Section 2.5 Eye-tracking Data Pre-processing.
d Indicates marginally comparisons (i.e., uncorrected).
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verbally expressing an interpretation of the metaphor.
Across groups, when participants chose an incorrect picture during
the metaphor trials, it was nearly always the literal picture that they
chose, but these incorrect literal picture selections were made sig-
nificantly more often by the schizophrenia group than by the healthy
controls (see Fig. 2). This suggests that individuals with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia are more likely than healthy individuals to interpret
metaphor statements (e.g., “John is a lion”) literally, rather than fig-
uratively, as intended.
It is commonly held that the literal meaning of the metaphor vehicle
must be inhibited in order to arrive at a figurative interpretation
(Gernsbacher et al., 2001; McGlone and Manfredi, 2001; Papagno et al.,
2003; Pierce et al., 2010; Rubio-Fernandez, 2007). It is therefore
plausible that individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia - a disorder
associated with deficits in inhibitory control (Badcock et al., 2002;
Mossaheb et al., 2014; Thoma et al., 2009) - fail to successfully inhibit
features associated with the literal interpretation of the metaphor ve-
hicle, leaving the literal meaning of the word to be accessible and
salient. This interpretation of the picture selection task findings is
supported by our eye-tracking data which can help provide implicit
measures of inhibition. Across both groups, the proportion of time spent
looking at the literal picture and the literal object within it were ne-
gatively related to the number of correctly selected metaphor pictures.
This finding suggests that when an individual failed to arrive at the
intended metaphorical interpretation of the metaphorical story, this
was (at least in part) due to an inability to successfully inhibit the literal
meaning of the metaphor vehicle. These findings tentatively suggest
that individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia embark on the same
comprehension procedure as healthy controls when interpreting novel
metaphorical statements/stories, but potentially due to inhibitory
control deficits, those standard comprehension procedures more often
stall in these individuals, leaving them to attend more to the literal
meaning of the metaphor vehicle, and ultimately arrive at a literal in-
terpretation of the statement/story as a whole.
Inhibitory control deficits are likely to be one of multiple factors
contributing to the poorer performance of our schizophrenia group on
the metaphor trials of the picture selection task. While we accounted for
verbal expression difficulties by including a visual response format, we
were not able to account for receptive difficulties that may be present in
individuals with schizophrenia. Arguably, the wider context depicted in
the story assists in the selection of the correct picture more in the
metaphor trials than in the literal trials, so any deficits in receptive
language skills and/or in working memory could also play a role in the
poorer performance of our schizophrenia group on the metaphor trials.
In addition,
Years of education, Full-scale IQ, Pre-morbid IQ, and ToM scores
were lower in patients compared with comparators, and age and years
of education predicted performance on the metaphor items of the pic-
ture selection task. This latter finding is perhaps not surprising, given
that metaphor interpretation involves the rapid integration of world
knowledge (i.e., a deep understanding of the concepts used and the
often complex and subtle associations between those concepts) into the
interpretation process. Given that previous findings have not been
consistent with respect to the relationship between ToM capacity and
metaphor comprehension, and that our metaphor items were mixed
with respect to the degree to which they pertained to emotional states,
it is perhaps not surprising that ToM scores did not predict performance
on the metaphor items. The drop in participant numbers for the eye
tracking task means that we had a smaller sample size than we had
hoped. To ensure a larger sample size in future studies with this po-
pulation, an eye-tracking task (which can be more daunting for in-
dividuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia) could be placed earlier on
in the protocol.
The results of this pilot study confirm previous reports of impaired
metaphor comprehension in schizophrenia, and for the first time, have
used a novel task that was not confounded by reliance on the meta-
linguistic competency required to generate verbal explanation for me-
taphorical stories. We replicated previous findings suggesting that
metaphor comprehension associates with performance on a theory of
mind task and further demonstrated that increased attendance to the
literal depictions of the story associates with impaired task perfor-
mance. Overall our findings tentatively suggest that an inability to in-
hibit attention on an inappropriate literal meaning may be contributing
to impaired metaphor comprehension. Further work is needed to un-
derstand the relationship between figurative language capacity and the
development and maintenance of psychotic symptoms.
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Table 3
Prediction of proportion of correct responses in metaphor trials based on cognitive and clinical characteristics.
Covariatea Effect of group in model Effect of covariate in model
Coefficient (CI) Wald-χ2 Coefficient (CI) Wald-χ2
Age 1.025 (0.617, 1.434) 24.187, p < .001 −0.018 (−0.035, 0.000) 3.933, p= .047
Years education 0.770 (0.347, 1.193) 12.736,p < .001 0.078 (0.026, 0.130) 8.618, p= .003
FSIQb 0.755 (0.281, 1.228) 9.759, p= .002 0.012 (−0.002, 0.026) 2.818, p= .093
NARTc 0.837 (0.383, 1.292) 13.044, p < .001 0.009 (−0.006, 0.025) 1.449, p= .229
TOMd 0.858 (0.395, 1.321) 13.190, p < .001 0.014 (−0.025, 0.054) 0.513, p= .474
PANSSe total n/a n/a −0.003 (−0.016, 0.010) 0.211, p= .646
PANSS positive n/a n/a 0.011 (−0.048, 0.027) 0.314, p= .575
PANSS negative n/a n/a 0.010 (−0.028, 0.047) 0.250, p= .617
PANSS general n/a n/a −0.011 (−0.037, 0.015) 0.717, p= .397
a Regressions were computed across groups with group and the respective covariate as predictors. As PANSS scores were only available for patients, healthy
controls were not included and the group predictor removed from the model.
b Full Scale IQ taken from the WASI.
c National Adult Reading Test (NART).
d Theory of mind measure, estimated using the Revised Eyes Test.
e Positive and Negative Symptom Scale for Schizophrenia.
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Appendix A
Practice items (fromDeamer et al., 2010; Deamer, 2013)
1. This weekend, Sally is at the park. She is having lots of fun riding on
her bike in the park.
2. This weekend, Sally is at the zoo. She is having lots of fun looking at
the lions.
Metaphor items (adapted from Rubio-Fernandez, 2007)
1. John doesn't like physical contact. Even his girlfriend finds it dif-
ficult to come close to him. John is a cactus.
2. After six months without going to the barber, John was a lion.
3. Mary is very materialistic. She is only interested in men who are
rich. Her latest boyfriend is a Mercedes.
4. On the dunes, someone had planted a few pine trees among the
local plants. The pine trees were skyscrapers.
5. Mary loved maths but this year the teacher was very boring. Every
lesson was a lullaby.
6. John spends four hours a day in the gym. His muscles are steel.
7. John likes to wear clothes that really stand out in the crowd. In his
new coat, John is a banana.
8. John was making a chocolate milkshake when the lid came off the
blender. When his mother saw him, she said John was a Dalmatian.
9. John loved paddling his canoe through the steep canyon. He
especially enjoyed rolling over in the white water of the rapids. The
river was champagne.
10. It was impossible to study at college during the maintenance work.
The carpenter next door was a woodpecker.
11. Mary had been sharing a flat with John for a long time. With him
she felt at ease even in silence. John was a pair of old slippers.
12. Things weren't going well for Mary. Her boyfriend had broken up
with her the same week she had lost her job. Sometimes life can be
a game of rugby.
13. Mary didn't like spending the night at her grandmother's. No matter
how many blankets she would put on the bed, that attic room was
Norway.
14. John and Mary have a new house with an amazing garden.
Actually, one cannot see the end of it from the back door. Their
garden is the Pacific.
15. Nobody wanted to run against John at school. John was a cheetah.
Literal items (fromDeamer et al., 2010; Deamer, 2013)
1. Sam and Mark had the weekend off, and went to a national park for
the weekend. The national park was a forest.
2. Tom decided to spend the day varnishing the garden fence. The
varnish Tom was using was a new brand. The varnish was highly
toxic.
3. Mary went home for the holidays to the small village where she had
grown up. She was surprised to see that they had developed the land
next to the church. The land was a cemetery.
4. The car park outside Jane's house was in a complete mess these
days. The car park had been vandalized.
5. It had been a fierce contest. The winner of this year's competition
was extremely powerful and supple. The champion is a true athlete.
6. Alice wanted to throw a party which would make a statement. She
managed to organize something very special for the great hall where
she was holding the party; it was an orchestra.
7. When you enter the main block, follow the signs; it is a long dark
corridor.
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